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Evans-Waiau vs. Tate 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 (June 16, 2022)1
Moving for a New Trial under Lioce
Summary
Both a procedural and substantive question were presented in this appeal. The procedural
question asked whether a party must move for a new trial in district court to preserve attorneymisconduct claims on appeal. The Court recently held that a party is not necessarily required to
move for a new trial to preserve its trial error-based arguments or ability to seek a new trial as an
appellate remedy.2
Respondents argue that the Court’s decision in Lioce v. Cohen requires a party to move
for a new trial to preserve a specific claim that attorney misconduct warrants a new trial.3 The
Court determined that Respondents read too much into Lioce and ignored the procedural nature
of that case. The Respondents were only concerned with whether the complaining parties
preserved their attorney misconduct arguments with contemporaneous objections.

Facts and Procedural History
The case was about a car accident that occurred in October of 2015. Desire Evans-Waiau
was driving westbound on Flamingo Boulevard. Guadalupe Parra-Mendez was a passenger in the
vehicle along with several children who are not parties to the appeal. According to Evans-Waiau
she stopped abruptly to avoid hitting a pedestrian in the crosswalk at the intersection of Flamingo
and Linq Lane. Babylyn Tate, Respondent, was driving behind Evans-Waiau. Evans-Waiau
braked suddenly, and Tate struck the rear of Evans-Waiau’s vehicle. Tate testified that she did
not seek either a brake light or a turn signal. Tate testified that she swerved and braked to avoid
the collision. No injuries were reported at the scene. Appellants filed a complaint several months
after the accident and after obtaining medical treatment had been obtained alleging that Tate
negligently operated her cause and caused appellants injury. Tate responded asserting that
Evans-Waiau was comparatively negligent as an affirmative defense and that appellants could
not otherwise prove that their medical treatment was casually related to the October accident.
At trial, appellants called Jorge Parra-Meza who is Evan-Waiau’s significant other ParraMendez’s brother as a witness. Parra-Meza owned the vehicle involved in the accident. He is
also the father of the children who were also in the vehicle. Parra-Meza stated that he had
“smoked-out” taillight covers on the vehicle which he installed after purchasing the vehicle.
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Parra-Meza also testified that the vehicle had been rear-ended twice after he added the smoke-out
lights. Tate introduced an audio/video recording that Parra-Meza made the night of the accident
in which he uses profanities. Appellants argued that the profanity-laced video carried a potential
for unfair prejudice that outweighed any probative value of the recording. The district court
concluded that the recording was relevant. The district court also allowed Tate to ask appellant’s
medical providers questions “regarding the existence of any past working relations with
appellants’ counsel involving medical liens only.” Tate called Dr. Schifini, a board-certified
anesthesiologist, as a witness. Dr. Schifini did not form an opinion as to whether the accident
caused the injuries but addressed whether the treatment the appellants received was reasonable
and necessary. Appellants moved to strike Dr. Schifini’s testimony. The district court denied the
motion. Before closing arguments, the district court provided two jury instructions related to
Evans-Waiau’s potential comparative negligence, No. 34 and No. 35.
During closing argument, Tate’s attorney discussed “the value of the dollar,” as it related
to appellants’ requested damages. Appellants objected on the basis that the argument improperly
suggested that Tate would be unable to pay appellants’ projected damages. The district court
sustained the objection as it assumed facts not in evidence but allowed Tate to make a
hypothetical argument about how long it would take a family to save the requested damages.
Appellants did not object to this argument. The jury found Tate not negligent, and the district
court entered judgment on the verdict. The court of appeals affirmed, the Court granted review.
Discussion
Appellants did not waive their attorney-misconduct claims by not moving for a trial in
district court
The plaintiff argues that the appellants waived their attorney-misconduct claims because
they did not move for a new trial before filing the appeal. Tate cited Lioce v. Cohen. The Court
disagreed. The Court recently addressed whether a party must move for a new trial to raise a
preserved issue on appeal in Rives.4 Noting, “a party need not file a motion for a new trial to
raise a preserved issue on appeal or request a new trial as a remedy for alleged errors below.”
Lioce rose from a post-trial motion process, but the procedural stance does not work as a barrier
to appellate review.
The Court addressed in Lioce “the issue of which standards district courts are to apply
when deciding motions for a new trial based on attorney misconduct,” noting that the issue was
framed that way because the underlying appeals were taken from orders granting or denying
motions for a new trial based on alleged attorney misconduct. A requirement that a party must
move for a new trial based on alleged attorney misconduct to preserve that issue for appeal was
never imposed. The Court concluded accordingly.
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Tate did not make an improper ability-to-pay argument
Appellants contend that Tate made an improper ability-to-pay argument in closing that
constituted reversible attorney misconduct. The Court disagreed. Specifically, all the cases on
which appellants rely focus on whether the defendant explicitly mentioned or asked the jury to
consider the defendant’s lack of wealth or inability to pay. Tate did not do that. Tate’s attorney
did, however, discuss the value of a dollar, and told the jury to determine what amount would
compensate the appellants and “what that money means to them.” There was no mention of
Tate’s inability to pay a judgment nor was Tate’s financial circumstances discussed.
The appellants contend that this argument also improperly encouraged jury nullification.
The Court determined that this was not the case. Rather, a hypothetical provided in the context of
the value of money and Tate thus argued that the evidence did not support negligence or the
necessary element of causation.
The argument did not constitute an impermissible golden-rule argument and the focus on
Tate’s statement that if a family was able to save $5,000 “they’d be doing - that’s better than
most of us,” met with no objection from the appellants in this revised closing argument and thus
the waiver applied.5 The appellants objected to the initial hypothetical only on the ground that it
was an impermissible ability-to-pay argument. No golden-rule objection was made even though
a golden-rule objection is distinct from an ability-to-pay objection.6
While a party must object to an improper attorney argument to preserve the issue for
appeal, when a party fails to object, the Court may still review allegations of such misconduct for
plain error. A party must show “that no reasonable explanation of the verdict exists,” in order to
succeed on a plain-error review of an unobjected-to attorney misconduct. In Tate, the statement
regarding saving $5,000 does not offset the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. The Court
spelled out evidence reviewed by the jury supporting the verdict.
Appellants’ remaining arguments do not warrant reversal
The Appellants argue that the court abused its discretion when it (1) admitted the ParraMeza audio/visual recording. The Court determined that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when admitting the recording. Citing that the recording was relevant to the case as it
spoke to both credibility and motivation in testifying.7 The recording and subsequent testimony
could show Para-Meza was motivated to inflate Evans-Waiau’s injuries, especially in light of the
minor damage to the vehicle.8 Evidence was presented to show Parra-Meza’s motivation in
testifying about Evans-Waiau’s injuries, it is not hearsay. Finally, the use of profanity does not
make the recording unduly prejudicial.9 The profanity used in the recording has become
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commonplace and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
recording as evidence. The jury would not be surprised at the profanity in light of the
circumstances in which Parra-Meza made the recording. (2) gave two comparative-negligence
jury instructions regarding appellants’ taillights. The district court did not abuse its discretion
when it gave comparative-negligence jury instructions. Both Evans-Waiau and Parra-Meza
testified that Parra-Meza installed aftermarket taillight covers that “smoked out” the rear
taillights. In testimony, Parra-Meza agreed that regular taillights are more visible and that he had
been rear -ended twice after he installed the ‘smoked out” taillight covers. Tate’s testimony
included that she did not see “any turn signal” or brake lights.10 (3) allowed Dr. Schifini to testify
as an expert witness. The Court was not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion by
allowing Dr. Schifini’s testimony.11 Dr. Schifini’s testimony assumed that the appellants were
injured in the crash and suffered the symptoms they reported. He concluded that several aspects
of the medical care appellants received were not reasonable. Dr/ Schifini’s testimony included
the plaintiff’s causation theory in his analysis and therefore the district court properly allowed it
as rebuttal expert testimony.

Conclusion
An appellant need not move for a new trial to raise claims of improper attorney
arguments on appeal if they preserved the issue with an objection. The Court concluded that the
alleged improper ability-to-pay argument and golden-rule arguments did not warrant reversal.
The Court further determined that the other alleged trial errors, abuse of discretion, did not occur
in the three areas of concern (1) admittance of the audio/video recording of Para-Meza met the
relevancy criteria, (2) giving comparative-negligence jury instructions in light of undisputed
testimony regarding the alternation of the taillight covers and turn signal use, and (3) allowing
Dr. Schifini to testify as an expert witness. Dr. Schifini met the requirement for an expert witness
testimony on causation. The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the jury verdict.
Dissent
Justices Stiglich, Silver, and Hendron dissented, noting that Tate’s counsel’s comments
during closing amounted to an impermissible ability-to-pay argument. The dissenting Justices
would reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.
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